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TIME-LIFE INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
April 16, 1980
a diplomatic
... !situation in which we have a perception

TIME:

that the American people feel that we are sort of very
lonely being, if not abandoned, at least not well enough
supported by our allies abroad.

I don't know whether

that's a generally held feeling, but you can just sense
that from the news reports and the letters to the editor
and that sort of thing.
I thought it would be most instructive to talk
to you on two levels today:

one, to ask you how

you

feel about this subject of what we should expect from
our allies and, more specifically, what the situation has
been here in Japan, in your view, in support of the initiatives that the President has taken.
of

Could you kind

ruminate on all that for me?

AMBASSADOR:

Well, most of our allies have problems, and

most of them have to analyze those problems before they
arrive at a decision as to whether or not they can comply
with our request.

By the same token, we have problems,

and if we are going to maintain an .1alliance I think that
due con s ideration should be given on e ach side toward the
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other as to what those problems are and how they add up
in the total picture, instead of in segments.
Some of our allies have been quite voluble in
expressing their support of us, but when the requests are
made they have to assess what their reaction should be.
The important factor is to achieve united action
on the part of our friends and allies, if possible.

Be-

cause of their divergent interests, there are bound to be
different responses.
As far as Japan is concerned, I think it has
been in the forefront in support of our positions and in
trying to accommodate itself to

the~.

Of all the nations

with whom we are allied, Japan is far and away the most
vulnerable defensively and economically.

They have to

contend with the development of a very strong Soviet Pacific
navy~

They have to contend with the return of Soviet

military personnel to three of the four Northern Islands
off Hokkaido, 20,000 there in 1962, I understand, then
reduced to almost nothing, now in the past year or so a
return to a strength of I might say approximately 10,000
more or less.

They live in an area which in my opinion

is the most important strategic area in the world--the
PRC, the Soviet Union, the U.S., Japan, with Korea in
between.

An argument could be made about the assertion
I have just made but, anyway, the geography will substantiate what I have just said.
Economically, they have really nothing in the
way of natural resources, so they depend upon petroleum
and raw materials to manufacture to export to survive.
Despite its vulnerability, the Japanese have
been our best military partners.
Let me change that and put it this way.
Despite their vulnerability, the relationship between the
Japanese and the American. military has been just about the
best there is in the world.

It is close, it is cooperative,

and it is appreciated on both sides.
As far as its support of the U.S. is concerned,
since the Iranian and Afghanistan crises, they have been
singled out from time to time as not moving fast enough
or far enough, but when the facts are examined they just
will not stand up.
way through.

They have supported us in Iran all the

They have not entered into any questionable

financial arrangements about Japan.

They have kept within

the confines of the limits we laid down.
Just the other day, I believe on Monday,
their steel industry announced that they would not enter
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any new contracts with Iran.

They have kept their oil

purchases within the limits in which they were before
the crisis broke out.

They were among the first as a

government to come out in favor of boycotting the Olympics,
and they are still as strong as ever in that respect.
They are looking into ways and means to make up for the
probable loss of Iranian oil to finding sources elsewhere
to falling back on their 95 to 100-day reserve, and with
Japan purchasing 13 percent of its oil needs from Iran,
that is going to be quite a difficult problem for them
to solve, but at least they are looking ahead and trying
to be helpful and doing the best they can.
I would hope that in some way, if this development occurs, that we would give serious consideration to
shipping our surplus Alaskan oil to Japan to compensate
for the loss of Iranian oil, and in that way help to
foreclose a difficult economic situation developing in
this country.
They have spoken out loud and strong in the
United Nations about Iran and Afghanistan, and they have
gone along with the Western Europeans, which I think could
be considered their bench mark.
And Prime Minist er Ohira in Sapporo just two
days ago -- I can't think of the exact quote, but something
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to the effect that support of the United States comes before oil imports from Iran.

_Q_:

I remember that.

A:

So I think their record is good, is sound, is

supportive, but I am not at all sure that that support is
understood or appreciated in the United States as a whole
because Japan by itself sort of stands out, whereas the
EC is considered as a whole .

L

.Q_:

I see.

You spoke earlier, Mr. Ambassador,

about the limits that we've laid down.

Was that in terms

of oil purchases?

A:

Oil purchases.

The Japanese, and I assume the

others, were asked to not increase their oil purchases beyond the limits of what they had been receiving before we
<.__four months ago.
announced that we would import no further oil from Iran three or I

.Q_:

There was that misunderstanding about the trading

companies' purchase of spot oil at the time of the hostage
taking which the government clamped down on entirely.
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A:

Yes, the government,before the Japanese were
~

criticized at the Paris press conference, . their government
at least ten days before had clamped down on those trading
companies when they became aware of what they were doing
and told them they couldn't ship any more oil into Japan.
They had to get rid of that elsewhere, and they urged them
to go back to a more reasonable price, which they did,
and the Japanese since that time bought very little, if
any, oil at spot market high prices.

My recollection is

that when they bought oil, which increased in price,
they didn't do it alone but they did it, for example, when
BP and other European oil companies were doing the same
and doing it ahead of them.

There have been a lot of direct deals which is
somewhat becoming a new way of buying oil apparently.
Have we advised them on our feeling about what direct
dealsought

to be done and what terms ought to be avoided,

or anything like that?

A:

Not that I recollect, Ed.

ask them to consider keeping

We have tried to

within a price structure

which would not shoot the price of oil way out of range.
They have done so, and when Iran raised its price some
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weeks ago from 30 to 32.50, the Japanese refused to pay
the high price, and I think they were joined in that respect
by the British as well.

Q:

Could you tell me some of the things that we

have asked the Japanese to do more specifically, some of
the things that we asked them and which they have done, or
some things that we have asked them to do that they have
not done or have not yet decided?

A:

By and large, I would say that what we requested

of them they have done to the best of their ability.

I

don't think they have extended any new credits to the Soviet
Union for Siberian development, nor to Iran.

Their stoppage

of new steel contracts they have done on their own initiative.

Their joining up with the EC in meeting with Bani

Sadr in behalf of the hostages was done promptly, just as
soon as they found out what the EC had agreed to do.

That

took a few hours because there is quite a difference in
time between

Lisbon

and Tokyo.

They have not pushed ahead on their petrochemical
complex, even though it represents a tremendous investment.
and if not carried through can cause havoc in Japan.
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They have kept their oil purchases on an average
within the limits which they had bought before, and they
were among the first to boycott the Olympics, the government.
Frankly, I don't know what they've been asked to
do that they haven't tried to do.
that's my recollection.

I could be wrong, but

But they've gotten very little

credit for it .

~:

That's true, and that sounds curious because I

wonder what the reason for that is.
,_
A:

Well, they are not very public relations conscious.

They don't know how to go to Washington like a Margaret
Thatcher and make a statement that she will lead the charge
in support of us.

When you get down to fine print it.

says "based on United Nations resolutions", and the Japanese
just go along and do their best, and they stand out by
themselves becau se of their location, but they don't know
how to publicize what they have done.

~:

Well, I was talking a moment ago when Bill Sherman

came through and also with Al.

~~ell,

there is a sort of
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natural presumption that the Japanese are always going to
be last, that the Japanese always resist, that they always
~

sort of crawfish, and that you always have to hold their
feet to the fire to get them to do anything.

A:

Not so.

Q:

I was asked, for instance, by the Star what kind

That's a perception.

of pressures is the U.S. applying to the Japanese.

The im-

plication was what are we doing to twist their tail to get
them to do these things?

A:

How would you respond to that?

We're not twisting their tail.

in tail twisting.

I don't believe

I never believed it in the Senate, and

I think if you want to get results you had better treat the
Japanese as equals.

You had better recognize their peculiar

problems and be aware of the fact that among all our allies
they have been the most forthcoming in all the areas in
which we
time.

have a relationship.

Sometimes it takes a little

That's the Japanese system, and I think that by

suggesting and suggesting and counselling and advising,
under the right circumstances, that you can achieve a
great deal more than you can through demands, pressures
and threats.

Those would be counter-productive.

•
l0

Q_:

From a broader point of view, it is suggested by

some people that with our automobile problem and the other
trade difficulties that we have with the Japanese, that
somehow or other cooperation between the U.S. and Japan
in areas like what we're talking about now--Iran,
Afghanistan and so on--might somehow be linked to a move
toward protectionism in the States?

Is there that sort

of unspoken threat lurking behind our relations?

A:

Absolutely not.

Absolutely not.

Our trade rela-

tions are good --they could be much better--when you figure
the Japanese had a 16.5 billion dollar current account
surplus at the beginning of last year, at the end of the
year it was down to about 8.6, decreased, not down to
8.6 surplus, but 8.6 below zero, that our trade imbalance
wa s r e d uc e d from l 1 . 5 t o a bo ut 8 . 5 , t h a t o u r e xpo r t s t·o
Japan increased 34 percent in '79 over '78, and in '78
they had increased 22 percent over '77, that our agricultural exports increased from 4.4 in '78 to 5.3 in '79
and will break 6 billion dollars this year.
Color TVs were way down.
21 percent over '77.

Steel in '78 was down

Last year it increased 0.7 percent

over '78 after a 21 percent decline a year before.

ll

So you might say it remained the same figure as a year
before, if you want to stretch it out over a two-year
span.
Textiles down about 34 percent :·. last year, the year
before down about 29 percent.
Autos in

1

78 10.1 percent increase over

last year 9.5 percent increase over

1

78.

1

77, and

That was the

big minus factor as far as we were concerned and the big
plus factor as far as the Japanese were concerned, but
we had a demand for these cars, their quality, competitively
priced, big demand, follow-through service, and our own
'-

industry finally has awakened to the fact that today the
big car is gone, and they are spending somewhere around
to
80 billion dollars/change over to the compacts and the
sub-compacts.

It takes a little time, so it creates a

void which the Japanese

fill, and Frazer becomes concerned

about the loss of 200,000 jobs as he should.
He wants the Japanese to invest in the United
States, as they will.

As they will.

Will they build cars there, do you

think, eventually?

A:

Yes.

And so does Ford want them to invest in the
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United States.

GM wants them to invest in the United

States but not to the extent that Ford and the UAW do.
The Japanese Government wants them to invest
in the United States.

The U.S. Government wants them to

invest in the United States.

I would like to see them

invest in the United States, but the decision is theirs,
Toyota and Nissan.
I'm glad you caught that throvm-in

statement, but

just watch the news beginning tomorrow afternoon ...
not as much as maybe you think but at least a good step
forward.

Q_:

I would be very interested.

seven years reporting on Detroit

As you know, I spent

before I came out here,

so I'm still very much interested.

II

A:

Just in the room ... truck ...

Q_:

Toyota?

A:

And Nissan.

Don't quote me till tomorrow . till it

breaks ... I didn't want you to get the idea it was an auto plant, passenger plant
Q_:

Can we talk a bit about defense?

You've addressed

yourself to this subject quite frequently and I know your
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basic feeling about it, but since the last time when we
spoke about defense, which was some months ago at the residence, you know the big group, when that silly thing
developed ...

XXX:

Sam Jameson.

~

Anyhow, the less said about that today, that was

when Sam said . . .

XXX:

Sam was sitting next to you.

~:

Henry started this thing and Sam wouldn't let it

die .

But, anyhow, the point is that there have been a lot

of suggestions since then about what Japan ought to do to
help the United States in its commitment out here, the 1atest
of which I guess was George Ball's suggestion that they
build an aircraft carrier and lease it to us.
reaction do

What kind of

you get from the Japanese about these sugges-

tions, this constant drumbeat on defense?

A:

Well, they're becoming more aware of what needs to

be done, and the statements emanating out of Washington
just add to what has already happened--the enlarged
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blue ocean navy, Sovi& Pacific fleet, the passage through
the Japan Sea of elements of that fleet down to Vietnam
intermittently
where they're using I Cam Ranh Bay, Da Nang, Haiphong
and also airfields for the Far East Air Force intermittently,
and the buildup of the Soviet military on three of the four
Northern Islands, the so-called Northern Territories,
the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, and the troubled
situation in Iran, and the accentuated press coverage of
defense-related statements by members of the Diet and
members of the industrial community.
I think are bringing

ho~to

All these factors

the Japanese an added recog-

nition of their vulnerability and the need on their part
to give serious consideration to do something more.
The Iranian situation brought about a rather
widespread dispersal of the Seventh Fleet, and in so doing
it took away some of the defensive shield covering Japan
under the Security Treaty.
So I think that what will come out of this will
be continued, steady and significant additions to the
Japanese budget, but naturally my thought what the
Japanese

have to do, they will have to do themselves on

their own responsibility.
They're buying up 123 F-15s, 45 anti-submarine
patrol planes, and up to 8 air command planes.

They're
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modernizing their navy as well.
very closely with ours.

Their navy is working

Their air force is carrying on

joint exercises with ours, and the guidelines bring about
a greater, more cooperative relationship defensewise, and
I would say that of all our allies we probably have the
best military-to-military relationship with the Japanese,
and I would like to see that maintained, and it will be
if we allow

the Japanese

to make their own decisions,

as we must and should, and in my opinion it also will be
satisfactory.
In my further opinion, the most important bilateral relationship in the world is that between the
U.S. and Japan because so much depends on us working together insofar as the security, the stability, prosperity
and the future of the Pacific and East Asia are concerned.

g_:

Do you share the opinion, Mr. Ambassador, held

by some that the Japanese are not sharing enough of the
defense burden in this part of the world?

A:

I think they are doing everything that can be

done up to this time, based on the obstacles which they
have had to overcome, namely Article 9, with which we had a
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great deal to do with inserting it in the peace constitution, and with which we had something to do with getting
around to the creation of a 75,000-man Police Reserve
Force, out of which came the Self-Defense Forces which,
like the Mutual Security Treaty, was not greeted with
enthusiasm by the Japanese people.
But now you have the Self-Defense Forces reaching
a credibility rating of somewhere around 90 percent in the
polls.

You have the Mutual Security Treaty being accepted

by something on the order of 82 to 85 percent, and when you
compare the days of the beginning of both, the lack of
appreciation or understanding of the Self-Defense Forces,
and the riots and demonstrations against the Mutual
Security Treaty, with what's happened in the last several
years, the difference is between day and night.
The Japanese have even gone beyond their territorial waters to join the United States in Rimpac '80
last month and joining with us, and also as a result the
Australian Navy and the New Zealand elements of their
navies.
They have had to keep in mind at all times the
memories of the Second War, especially in Southeast Asia,
and all we have to do to go back to less than a decade
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is to recall Tanaka's visit and the demonstrations against
him in Jakarta andBangkok, Miki's desire to go to ASEAN,
but no invitation forthcoming, I

understand ~

Fukuda's

well planned visit, and out of it the Fukuda Doctrine.
Since that time, the emergence of policies
reaching out to the rest of the world.
probably visited very continent.

Sonoda, for example,

The extension of their

aid programs more and more being untied, not only the
extension but the increase in amounts, the Treaty of
Peace and Friendship with China.

All those things are

indications of Japan pulling itself out of isolation, out
of its cocoon, and

becomi~g

part of the interdependent

world, all to the good for Japan and for the rest of us.
So I think that when you consider this 8 percent
average increase in defense expenditures for the last ten
years, they've done quite well.

You know the rest of the

figures as they apply to NATO and the U.S.
I was just looking over some figures the other
day, and I think since 1975 till the end of 1978, over a
five-year period, they have doubled their defense expenditures.

Today they rank seventh or eighth among the

nation s of th e world.

_Q_:

of. ...

Not bad for a country that forswears the keeping
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Within the con$titution.

Q:

There are some suggestions here among people I've

talked to, Japanese that I have talked to, they find
American, particularly President Carter's, actions since
Iran to be very hard for them to follow in terms of knowing
what to do next.

For instance, they say that Nixon, for

instance, was much more predictable and that they find
Carter to sort of flail away at targets and seems to say,
all right now, we want an embargo, and then move back from
that point and then comeback to it.
don't know how to operate:
judge how far

A:

They claim that they

They don't know really how to

Japan ought to go.

~ have a ~~t)
/But~ey've got to consider the extraordinarily

difficult position in which Carter finds himself, not only
in Iran and Afghanistan, but in the economic situation at
home as well.

What Carter has been doing is making a

series of moves, and where possibility existed, drawing
back to see if drawing back would not bring about or accelerate or further the release of the hostages, which is
the number one factor.
I think that anyone who criticizes Carter ought to
ask themselves this question:

What would I do if I were in
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the President's shoes and had that tremendous responsibility?
And I must say that I don't see much in the way
of alternatives being advanced during the course of the
presidential campaign.

Carter is doing the best he can

under unimaginable difficulties, and he's trying to remind
our friends and allies that what is happening to us in
Teheran, what is happening to us in Bogota, could happen
to them as well because it's an outright flouting of international law in which all countries are supposed to be
joined.
I think he has shown great patience, and I hope
he continues to show great patience in the months ahead because the situation is so difficult that if a wrong move
was made, it could well unite the states of Islam, and it could
very possibly furnish a most appropriate opportunity for
the Soviet Union to become involved on that side,

taki~g

advantage of a situation which might develop, and might
endanger the lives of the hostages, which is the one thing
that Carter is keeping utmost in his mind should not be
done.

They should be freed.

turn the key in the lock.

He hasn't found the way to

I know of no one else who has,

either, but he has kept the freedom in coming out alive
of those hostages as his number one objective.
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Q:

Wasn't it a disappointment to you, Mr. Ambassador,

as an American that when the hostages were taken that every
country in the world, at least in the free world, didn't
immediately come out and make some kind of representations
about it?

A:

I was.

Q:

It was I think in many ways a terrible disappoint-

ment to see such an obvious case, and we seemed to be left
all alone standing out there.
slow.

Even the Japanese were

They were slow to come to say.

Obviously everyone

has different stakes, as you pointed out.

Everyone has a

different stake in many of these situations, but the violation
of every human tenet seemed so obvious and blatant in that
case.

A:

I would suppose, Ed, or assume that they and we

thought that it might be only a matter of days because there
had been a similar incident some months before up there, a
matter of a few hours.

Q:

Yes, as a matter of fact, at Teheran that embassy

has been sort of under siege since the revolution began
in some ways.
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A:

You know, in that situation the most far out fie-

tion writer couldn't

have imagined what occurred and what

is now taking place.

You've really got no government.

You've got these militants evidently in control, the student
militants, and nobody can exercise responsbility as head
of state.

Q:

I don't know what is happening in the situation

right now, but obviously at least the hostages, according
, who ~y~e been iJl)
to the medical peopler,-are-physically in fairly good shape.

A:

Excepting that somebody said that .... a couple of

L

them might be in psychological trouble.

I think I read

that in the papers.

Q:

Depression.

I can understand that.

Now, taking a more general broad view of all the
things we've talked about so far, do you see the leadership
role of the United States in the world changing in any
major way?
dead?

Is what used to be called Pax Americana

Are we moving into an era where we and other coun-

tries, where we cannot expect the kind of automatic responses
that years ago we used to get from our allies?
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A:

Yes.

I think conditions have changed.

The world

has changed, and it has brought about a reorientation of
most of the globe.
change as well.

In the process, we have undergone a

Developing countries are becoming more

developed ..... (Note:

end of Side A.) ... forced to change

with it .. .

Have we worked out a mechanism for dealing with
this change?

For instance, if we can no longer expect

people to follow us right down the line, do we have a way
of reaching or finding what the minimal consensus of our
allies is?

It seems a little awkward to me ...

A:

We're finding it out right now, Ed.

Q:

That's what's happening now, isn't it?

We're

learning it the hard way.

A:

That's right, and we're learning it in time of

great need and great difficulties, a most unusual situation,
the like of which we'll probably never see again unless this
establishes a precedent.
The world has changed and will continue to change,
but we'll have to accommodate ourselves to that change and
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recognize that our resources our limited, our people
comprise only a small proportion of the people of the earth,
and that in many respects we're becoming a have-not
nation as our resources are depleted right now, and that
as the world becomes smallerdue to

instantaneous communi-

cation and faster flying aircraft, that we're becoming in
effect a part of the neighborhood, and that the globe in
mea~in.g;

its ~fis rapidly becoming a thing of the past.
I think we're moving too fast, accomplishing
too much scientifically too soon.

That's the way the

world is, and I will accommodate myself to it and coin
the phrase "I look back on the good old days with some
nostalgia."

Yes.

You can elevate yourself, but you don't have

to like it.

A:

I like it, too.

.Q_:

You like it, too.

A:

I like it.

Q:

If this thing is changing, the thing that worries

(laughter)

That's all I got to live with.

(laughter

a lot of people, and should I believe, is we recognize the

•
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competition with the Soviet Union for the hearts and minds

of the

~orld's

peoples, and we have been in the forefront.

We stood out there pretty much alone for a long time, but
now if we must do everything, if we can do nothing except
in concert with our allies, many of our allies are very
relaxed about Soviet intentions, much more relaxed than
we are, and isn't it possible that we and our allies can
make some big mistakes in this?

A:

That's always possible, Ed, especially in times

of stresses and strains .

But there has to come not a

disestablishing of our alliances, but a more equitable
sharing of responsibilities, and they just can't be .turned ·down,
possibly to the extent they used to, because .... and they've got to
face up to what the world is to them, too.
.Q_:

We've said, for instance, after all we said about

the Olympics that there is an issue that we think is important.

The Olympics just happens to be one way we can

make our voices felt, and it looked like ' such a perfect
way for other nations to make a statement, and we caught
all kinds of hell for this around the world.

A:

Even at home.
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Q:

And even at home.

I mean it's almost shameful

I think that we had to send the Vice President up there to
talk to those people, that they could not grasp the issue
without having to be told about it.

I don't think it looked

good to our allies, either.
But if everyone makes his own deciston, we're
becoming more and more a part of an interdependent world.
Yet, sometimes decisions made by committees don't get the
job done, and doesn't this imply that eventually the
just
United States may/ have to do a lot of things on its own?

A:

No, we can't afford to because of a shrinking

globe ...... communications.

We're neighbors.

We'll have to

get along ...... If the United States were cruising alone
we would just fall back into Fortress America, and that's
not the answer, either.

Q:

Then the answer is convincing our friends and allies

that what we are doing is right, that what we are proposing
is right.

A:

Yes, and from our point of view it is right.

But

these other natmns will have to look at it from their particular points of view.
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~:

We're one of the few nations in the world, Mr.

Ambassador, where we do take stands that seem very moral to
us.

I don't suggest that we've gone back to the John

Foster Dulles days and worldwide Presbyterianism, but we do
tend to see things as right or wrong and at some point pragmatism falls away and we say: yes, I know we will lose money
if we do this, but this is something that we have to do
for a greater reason.
Many other countries don't ever see it that way
and do not have that tradition.

A:

But everything isn't black and white.

There's

always grey areas in betw e en from which we can reach an
accommodation or understanding.

And there aren't always

just two sides to the argu ment.

Someti me s there are more.

~:

You said sometimes there is only one.

A:

Well, ........ Sometimes it's hard to arrive at a

decision, but I wish th e re was some way, that as George Aiken
and I tried to twice pass an amendment to the Constitution
which would allow the president to serve

only one term,

six years, do away with this terribly difficult, in some
respects phoney primary syst e m we have covering individual
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states, wearing out all the candidates, do away with the
L They_' re the ones "'ib_
o e l_gct ti')_~_P_r~_~ijen_t,j
electoral college.
and we are not bound by what the

r

people of their state have voted for.
I frankly am glad to see Carter staying in the
rose garden.

.Q_:

He's sure catching hell for it .

A:

But his job as president is to be in that White

House and to look after the affairs of our country, both
domestically and in the international field, and he doesn't
spend his time in the rose . garden ........ looking out of the
Oval Office.

But he does spend his time in the White House,

where he's supposed to be, and he does spend his time trying
to do something about
nation.

.Q_:

the difficulties which confront the

That's his job .

Well, he wanted it, but he got more than he bar-

gained for, I think.

A:

They all do.

.Q_:

Fanta s tic job .

A:

The only postwar president who didn't, I think,

..
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was Eisenhower, project the grandfather image, relatively
quiet times at the height of our power and prestige.

I

thought he could have done a lot more while he was in there,
ldidn't dQ_to~ ba~J
but the more I look back on h1m. He /Nor aid Gerry Ford.
He was the right man at the right time in the right place.
He sort of healed the wounds or carried us over the cliff.
eWe have

~med_!.o

find)
Q:
/~the right people. At the time it doesn't seem
. Lthough~,J.-lTli_ght _s_ay__.)
11 ke n~r very often 1 t looks pretty bad.

A:

Of course, we did know that Gerry Ford was in

there at the right tim e ... . .. catastrophic events which
occurred.

XXX:

I was surprised at your question about Nixon being

more predictable than Carter ...

Q:

The Japane s e say t ha t.

XXX:

... because they mus t hav e forgotten the Nixon

shock, China.

A:

The only answer you ge t i s when we bring it up, the

only an s wer you get is the thing s he did you could have
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predicted, you could have predicted the things he did, such
as recognition of Red China.

XXX:

Embargoing soybeans?

A:

I could have predicted his visit to China if I had

been outside.

I knew his interest because I used to have
a

breakfast with him once or twice a month as/Leader.

The

first thing he talked to me about was China, and what he
wanted to do was to reestablish relations, but

if~

had been

outside I wouldn't have believed him.

Q:

The Japanese here say, in answer to that, is they

knew it was just a matter of time.

They didn't expect him

to go and make the visit, but the U.S. recognition of China
was just something .... I had to explore this deeply witb
the two sources who brought this up.

They felt that you

could pretty well tell what Nixon was going to do, but times
are much different under Carter.

Who could have predicted

the revolution in Iran, for instance?

A:

That's right, which was

a surprise, but I under-

stand that Nixon has a new book out in which he is already
blaming us for losing World War 3, or else for getting into it,
I forget which.

He has all the answers.

r
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I've been struggling my way through Kissinger's

Q:

book.

Have you read it?

A:

No, I'm waiting till I have some time.

It's going

to be hard on my chest and arms.

Q:

You can't read it in bed.

(laughter)

It's sur-

prisingly well written, I must say that.

A:

Yes, what I've seen of it and what I've heard of it.

Q:

I think it's quite a good book.

argue as you go along.

I mean you can

I mean you can find many places to

argue with him, but he makes a very good case.
half way through.

I'm only about

I think he handles Vietnam very well.

A:

From his point of view.

Q_:

Yes, from his point of view.

A:

Which is opposite to my point of view.

Q:

You don't expect him to come out second best in his

own book.
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A:

No, no.

He has some very good words and he has

a darn good mind .

.Q_:

Yes, he does.

There are so many flat assertions

about the sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia .... He just says
what goes out as though they are facts.
?

A:

But they never found, what do they call it,

.Q_:

(laughter)

Tha t's r i gh t .

~on~em?.

Th i s wa s t h e n e r v e

center of the whole operation.

A:

Did he know where it was?

XXX:

Didn't Nixon go on television and talk about that?

A:

Yes, he went on television.

He called the leadership

down about 6 . 30, I guess, mayb e 7 o'clock, and then we went

LBo o_rn. 1

down in the basementwhile he went to the Ovaf/I guess to
make the broadcast, and I wanted to get out of the basement
but I couldn't get out.

They wouldn't let me out. (laughter)

.Q_:

Were you locked in there?

A:

Locked in.

I didn't approve of what he was doing ....
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